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A classical topic in monetary economics is measuring the burden that in￿ ation imposes on society.
The standard methodology, pioneered by Bailey (1956) and Friedman (1969) and reviewed in Lucas
(2000), consists of estimating a reduced-form money demand function and measuring the welfare
cost of in￿ ation as the area underneath money demand.1 The rationale for this approach is based
on competitive general equilibrium models where money enters the utility function, or a cash-
in-advance constraint.2 Unfortunately, as pointed out by Wallace (2001), such models contain
hidden inconsistencies and they are ill-suited for normative analysis as they fail to account for
the social bene￿ts that monetary exchange provides to the economy. To illustrate quantitatively
the importance of this critique, Lagos and Wright (2005) ￿denoted LW hereafter ￿calibrate a
model with microfoundations for monetary exchange and provide estimates for the annual cost of
10 percent in￿ ation. Their estimates are multiple times larger than those of standard reduced-form
monetary models, up to 5 percent of GDP. This result led Williamson and Wright (2010) in their
review article on New Monetarist Economics to conclude that ￿the intertemporal distortion induced
by in￿ ation may be more costly than many economists used to think.￿
The quantitative insights of LW, however, are subject to the caveat of Hu, Kennan, and Wallace
(2009), regarding the trading mechanisms that are typically assumed when measuring the welfare
cost of in￿ ation. The problem is that these trading mechanisms are socially ine¢ cient, which raises
the concern that the large welfare costs of in￿ ation are not due to the frictions that make money
essential but to the adoption of ine¢ cient mechanisms (e.g., the Nash bargaining solution). It is
for this reason and others ￿namely, to establish the essentiality of money and the robustness of
policy prescriptions ￿that Wallace (2001, 2010) recommends that monetary theory be pursued
by applying mechanism design. The objective of this paper is to do precisely that, i.e., to use
mechanism design to determine the part of the welfare cost of in￿ ation that can be attributed to
monetary frictions alone ￿the irreducible cost of in￿ ation. I will derive the money demand that is
part of a constrained-e¢ cient allocation, check whether the model can ￿t the data, and measure
1For an application of this method to the recent behavior of U.S. money demand, see Ireland (2009).
2For recent examples of general equilibrium models with cash-in-advance constraints or money-in-the-utility-
function, see Dotsey and Ireland (1996), Burstein and Hellwig (2008) and da Costa and Werning (2008).
1the cost of in￿ ation.3
I show that the money demand generated by the LW model under socially optimal mechanisms
takes the form of a correspondence. Below a threshold for the in￿ ation rate, there is an interval
of real balances that are consistent with the implementation of the ￿rst-best allocation, and the
measure of this interval shrinks with in￿ ation. Above a threshold for the in￿ ation rate money
demand is a singleton, and real balances and welfare are decreasing with the in￿ ation rate.
When calibrated to ￿t the data, based on the methodology of Lucas (2000), I ￿nd parametriza-
tions such that all the annual observations in the data for the U.S. over 1900-2006 are consistent
with the model. For such parameterizations the welfare cost of 10 percent in￿ ation is 0. Thus, for
plausible calibrations of the LW model moderate in￿ ation generates no burden for society when
the only frictions in the environment are the ones that make money essential. This result turns
on its head the prevailing wisdom that monetary environments generate large costs of in￿ ation:
they only do so to the extent that suboptimal mechanisms are employed. It also con￿rms that
the standard approach to estimating the cost of in￿ ation, the area underneath money demand, has
dubious foundations.
I check the robustness of the results to di⁄erent extensions. For instance, I consider di⁄erent
assumptions regarding the observability of agents￿money holdings. I also introduce match-speci￿c
heterogeneity (idiosyncratic preference shocks) and private information. Finally, I re￿ne money
demand by introducing a participation decision that endogenizes the frequency at which agents
trade. This extension provides a natural way to pin down the transfer of real balances in bilateral
matches. The model generates a downward-sloping money demand consistent with the data and, for
some parametrizations, the cost of in￿ ation is zero. This is in contrast to Shi (1997) and Rocheteau
and Wright (2009), who showed that under bargaining, social welfare can be nonmonotonic with
in￿ ation and small in￿ ation can be bene￿cial, thereby justifying departures from the Friedman rule.
There is a growing literature, surveyed in Craig and Rocheteau (2008), measuring the welfare
cost of in￿ ation in the context of microfounded models of monetary exchange under di⁄erent trading
mechanisms.4 In contrast to this literature I endogenize the trading mechanism in decentralized
3In the context of the labor market, the idea of imposing a socially optimal mechanism when calibrating a search-
theoretic model can be found in Shimer (2005).
4Rocheteau and Wright (2009) compute the welfare cost of in￿ ation under di⁄erent mechanisms and with en-
dogenous participation decisions. Reed and Waller (2006) introduce a risk-sharing motive. Aruoba, Waller, and
Wright (2010) calibrate versions of the model with capital. Aruoba and Chugh (2010) show that the Friedman rule
2markets so that it implements a constrained-e¢ cient allocation.5 Relative to Hu, Kennan, and
Wallace (2009), I characterize money demand and calibrate the model under di⁄erent assumptions
regarding the observability of money holdings. I introduce match-speci￿c heterogeneity and private
information, and endogenous participation decisions to re￿ne money demand.
The paper is organized as follows. The environment is described in Section 2. The optimal
mechanism and the money demand correspondence are characterized in Section 3. The model is
calibrated in Section 5. Match-speci￿c heterogeneity and endogenous participation decisions are
introduced in Sections 6 and 7, respectively.
2 The environment
The environment is similar to the one in Lagos and Wright (2005). Time is discrete and continues
forever. There is a continuum of in￿nitely-lived agents with measure one. Each period is divided
into two stages. In the ￿rst stage agents trade in a decentralized market with pairwise meetings,
denoted DM, while in the second stage they trade in a centralized market, denoted CM.
In the DM, an agent is either a buyer, with probability n 2 (0;1), or a seller, with probability
1￿n. Up to Section 7 n is exogenous, while in Section 7 the composition of the market is endogenous.
Buyers and sellers are matched bilaterally: a buyer meets a seller with probability ￿b, while a seller
meets a buyer with probability ￿s, with n￿b = (1￿n)￿s. In the CM, agents, who are price-takers,
trade a perishable good, called the numØraire good, labor and money.





is not optimal, and the long-run capital income tax is not zero. Boel and Camera (2009) extend the model to obtain
an equilibrium dispersion in wealth and show that the impact of in￿ ation varies across segments of society. Boel
and Camera (2010) compute the cost of in￿ ation across OECD countries. Chiu and Molico (2010) introduce costly
liquidity management and show that the cost of in￿ ation is signi￿cantly lower than previous estimates, thanks to
redistributional e⁄ects.
5Kocherlakota (1998) and Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) were the ￿rst to use implementation theory to prove
the essentiality of money. Applications of mechanism design to monetary theory include Cavalcanti and Wallace
(1999) and Mattesini, Monnet, and Wright (2010) on banking and inside money, Cavalcanti and Erosa (2008) on
the propagation of shocks in monetary economies, Cavalcanti and Nosal (2009) on cyclical monetary policy, Koeppl,
Monnet, and Temzelides (2008) on settlement, and Deviatov and Wallace (2001) and Deviatov (2006) on the welfare
gains of money creation. A related, but partial equilibrium, analysis was provided in Berentsen and Rocheteau (2002)
in the context of a model with divisible money.
3where ￿ ￿ (1 + r)￿1 2 (0;1) is the discount factor, qt is DM consumption, et is the DM level
of e⁄ort, ct is CM consumption, and ht is the supply of hours in the CM. For tractability, U is
additively separable and linear in hours, U(q;e;c;h) = u(q) ￿ (e) + U(c) ￿ h. The technology in
the DM is such that q = e. The utility function is well-behaved, and q￿ = argmax[u(q) ￿  (q)].
I also assume without loss in generality that u(0) =  (0) = 0. Output in the CM is produced
according to a linear production function in labor, which implies the (real) wage rate is equal to 1.
All goods are perishable across both stages and time. Agents cannot commit to future actions,
and individual histories are private information. These assumptions rule out credit arrangements
and generate an essential role for money. The quantity of ￿at money per capita at the beginning
of period t is Mt > 0, with Mt+1 = ￿Mt. The money growth rate, ￿ ￿ 1 + ￿, is constant and new
money is injected by lump-sum transfers (or taxes if ￿ < 1) in the CM.6 I will not impose that the
money growth rate is chosen optimally since my focus is on socially optimal trading arrangements
under di⁄erent in￿ ation rates. The price of goods in terms of money in the CM is denoted pt.
Agents￿money holdings in a match are not observable: an agent can hide his money holdings
or overstate them.7 This assumption limits the ability of the mechanism to punish the seller in
a bilateral match who does not hold su¢ cient real balances. Also, it will be consistent with the
de￿nition of money that includes demand and checkable deposits, M1, when I calibrate the model.
3 Constrained-e¢ cient allocations
I ￿rst consider a version of the model in which each agent receives an idiosyncratic shock at the
beginning of the DM that determines whether he is a buyer (he wants to consume but cannot
produce) with probability n, or a seller (he can produce but does not want to consume) with
probability 1￿n. I set n = 1=2, so that each agent is equally likely to be a buyer or a seller in the
DM, and ￿ = ￿b = ￿s, which is implied by bilateral matching, and denote ￿ = ￿=2.
The terms of trade in the DM are determined according to the following game. In the ￿rst
stage the buyer and the seller announce simultaneously their real balances, zb and zs, respectively.
6In the case where ￿ < 0, the government has the power to impose in￿nite penalties on agents who do not pay
taxes. The government, however, does not have the technology to monitor DM and CM trades and cannot observe
agents￿real balances. Hu, Kennan, and Wallace (2009) and Andolfatto (2010) study the case where agents can choose
whether or not to participate in the CM and pay taxes.
7In Section 4 I determine the set of incentive-feasible allocations with unobservable money holdings.
4A mechanism in the DM, [q;d] : R2+ ! R+ ￿ R+, maps the announced real money holdings of
the buyer and the seller in a proposed allocation, (q;d) 2 R+ ￿
￿
￿zs;zb￿
, where q is the quantity
produced by the seller and consumed by the buyer and d is a transfer of real balances from the
buyer to the seller. The allocation is restricted to the pairwise core of the meetings in the DM.8
In the second stage of the game the buyer and the seller simultaneously say "yes" or "no" to the
proposed allocation. If they both say "yes," and if the transfer of money is feasible given the buyer￿ s
actual money holdings, then the trade takes place. Otherwise, there is no trade. This second stage
guarantees that both agents can walk away from the proposed trade.
I consider stationary, symmetric allocations. Such an allocation is de￿ned by a triple (qp;dp;zp),
where (qp;dp) is the trade in all matches in the DM and zp is agents￿real balances or, equivalently,
the production of the CM good by agents not holding money at the beginning of the CM. By the
clearing of the money market in the CM, Mt=pt = zp, which implies pt+1 = ￿pt.
Given a mechanism, [q;d], Bellman￿ s equation for an agent in the DM holding z = m=p units
of real balances is
V (z) = ￿ fu[q(z;zp)] + W [z ￿ d(z;zp)]g+
￿ f￿  [q (zp;z)] + W [z + d(zp;z)]g + (1 ￿ 2￿)W(z); (1)
where W(z) is the value function of the agent in the CM. Equation (1) has the following interpre-
tation. An agent is a consumer who meets a producer with probability ￿. He consumes q units
of goods and delivers d units of real balances (expressed in terms of CM output) to his trading
partner. The terms of trade (q;d) depend on the (truthfully) announced real balances of the buyer
and the seller in the match. With probability ￿, the agent is a producer who meets a consumer.
He produces q for his trading partner and receives d real balances. With probability 1 ￿ 2￿, no
trade takes place.
The CM problem of the agent is
W(z) = max
c;^ z
fU(c) ￿ c + T + z ￿ ￿^ z + ￿V (^ z)g; (2)
8Zhu (2008) proposes a coalition-proof game that guarantees that any trade in the DM is in the pairwise core.
This game works as follows. First, the buyer and the seller in the match announce simultaneously their real money
holdings. Second, an allocation that depends on the announced money holdings is proposed. The buyer and the seller
simultaneously accept or reject the proposed allocation. If it is rejected by one of the two players, the game ends.
Otherwise, the seller makes a counterproposal. Third, the buyer can choose which trade is carried out, the seller￿ s
countero⁄er or the initial o⁄er.
5where T is the lump-sum transfer (expressed in numØraire goods), and ^ z is the real balances taken
into the next DM. I have used the budget constraint according to which the CM supply of hours
is h = c + ￿^ z ￿ z ￿ T and the relative price of real balances next period in terms of current-period
CM output is pt+1=pt = ￿. From (2), the maximizing choice of ^ z is independent of z; and W is
linear in z, with Wz = 1.
Substituting V (^ z) by its expression given by (1), using the linearity of W(z), and ignoring the
constant terms, one can reformulate the agent￿ s problem in the CM as
max
z￿0
f￿￿z + ￿ f￿ fu[q(z;zp)] ￿ d(z;zp)g + ￿ fd(zp;z) ￿   [q (zp;z)]g + zgg:
Divide the previous expression by ￿ and denote i ￿ (1+￿)(1+r)￿1, which can be interpreted as
the nominal interest rate that would be paid on an illiquid bond, to get:
max
z￿0
f￿iz + ￿ fu[q(z;zp)] ￿ d(z;zp)g + ￿ fd(zp;z) ￿  [q(zp;z)]gg: (3)
Given a mechanism, [q(￿;￿);d(￿;￿)], a seller reports the level of real balances that maximizes
his expected surplus, taking as given that the buyer will report his own real balances truthfully,
^ zs 2 argmaxz fd(zp;z) ￿  [q(zp;z)]g = dp ￿   (qp). A necessary condition for the mechanism to
be incentive-compatible is that the seller￿ s expected surplus is independent of his announced real
balances. Consequently, for any incentive-compatible mechanism, the choice of real balances, (3),
can be reexpressed as
max
z￿0
f￿iz + ￿ fu[q(z;zp)] ￿ d(z;zp)gg: (4)
The optimal choice of real balances maximizes the expected surplus of a buyer in the DM net of
the cost of holding real balances.
While a seller can overstate his real balances without fear of negative consequences, the same




then the trade is not feasible and cannot be carried out. The optimal announcement of a buyer
who holds zb is then ^ zb 2 argmaxz fu[q(z;zp)] ￿ d(z;zp)gIfd(z;zp)￿zbg, where Ifd￿zbg is an indicator
function that is equal to one if d ￿ zb.
Given that money holdings are unobservable, agents will not hold more money than what they
intend to spend, zp = dp. From (4), a necessary condition for the allocation to be incentive feasible
is
￿idp + ￿ [u(qp) ￿ dp] ￿ 0: (5)
6The left side of (5) is the expected surplus of a buyer in the DM, net of the cost of holding
real balances according to the proposed allocation. A deviation that is always feasible consists
of not accumulating money in the CM and not trading as a buyer in the DM. The expected
payo⁄ associated with this defection is 0. The allocation must also satisfy the seller￿ s participation
constraint,
￿  (qp) + dp ￿ 0: (6)
There is a similar condition for buyers, u(qp) ￿ dp ￿ 0, but it is implied by (5) and dp ￿ 0.
At this point it is useful to characterize the pairwise core of a meeting between a buyer holding
zb real balances and a seller holding zs real balances. The pairwise core, denoted C(zb;zs), is the
set of all feasible allocations, (q;d) 2 R+ ￿
￿
￿zs;zb￿
, such that no alternative feasible allocations
exist that would make the buyer and the seller in the match better o⁄, with at least one of the two
being strictly better o⁄. Formally:
C(zb;zs) =
n




and ￿  (q) + d ￿ Us for some Us ￿ 0g:
This gives:














￿ fzbg if zb <  (q￿):
If the buyer￿ s real balances are larger than the amount he is willing to pay for the ￿rst-best level
of output, u(q￿), then any allocation in the pairwise core implements the e¢ cient level of output,
and the transfer of real balances is between the seller￿ s cost and the buyer￿ s willingness to pay. If
the buyer￿ s real balances are less than his willingness to pay for the ￿rst-best level of output, u(q￿),
but greater than the seller￿ s cost,  (q￿), then the ￿rst-best allocation is achieved provided that the
seller￿ s surplus is not too large; otherwise, the buyer transfers all of his real balances, and output is
less than the e¢ cient level. Finally, if the buyer￿ s real balances are not large enough to compensate
the seller for the cost of producing the ￿rst-best level of output, then any allocation in the pairwise
core is such that the buyer transfers all his real balances, and the output level is ine¢ ciently low.
7Lemma 1 Any allocation (qp;dp;zp) such that zp = dp and (qp;dp) 2 C(zp;zp) that satis￿es (5)





q;d￿zb [d ￿  (q)] s.t. u(q) ￿ d ￿ u(qp) ￿ dp if zb ￿ dp; (7)
= arg max
q;d￿zb [d ￿  (q)] s.t. u(q) ￿ d = 0 otherwise. (8)
According to (7) if the buyer holds more than dp real balances, then the mechanism speci￿es a
pairwise Pareto-e¢ cient allocation that gives the buyer a surplus that is at least equal to what he
would obtain under the trade (qp;dp). According to (8) if the buyer holds less than dp real balances,
then the mechanism chooses the allocation that maximizes the seller￿ s surplus subject to the buyer
being indi⁄erent between trading or not trading. Figure 1 represents graphically the mechanism in
(7)-(8). The buyer￿ s surplus is Ub = u(q) ￿ d, while the seller￿ s surplus is Us = ￿ (q) + d. The
pairwise core (in the utilities space) is downward-sloping and concave. The utility levels associated
with the proposed trade, (qp;dp), are denoted ￿ Ub and ￿ Us. If the buyer holds more than zp real
balances, then the Pareto frontier shifts outward. The mechanism selects the point on the Pareto
frontier marked by a circle that assigns the same utility level, ￿ Ub, to the buyer. If the buyer holds
less than zp real balances, the Pareto frontier shifts downward. The mechanism selects the point
on the frontier that assigns no utility to the buyer, Ub = 0.
The proof of Lemma 1 is contained in Figure 2. The top panel of Figure 2 represents the
buyer￿ s surplus as a function of his real balances. The buyer￿ s surplus is (weakly) monotonically
increasing in his real balances, which implies that the buyer has no incentive to hide some of his
money holdings. He has no incentive to overstate his real balances either since for all z ￿ dp the
buyer￿ s surplus is constant and if the buyer holds less than dp but reports ^ z ￿ dp then the trade
is not feasible. The bottom panel represents the buyer￿ s surplus net of the cost of holding real
balances. From (3) and the bottom panel of Figure 2 it is easy to check that the agent will choose
z = dp if (5) holds.
I de￿ne an optimal mechanism as a trading mechanism described in Lemma 1 that maximizes
society￿ s welfare, denoted W.
De￿nition 1 An optimal mechanism is a [q (￿;￿);d(￿;￿)] de￿ned by (7)-(8); where (qp;dp) 2 C(dp;dp)
8b U
s U
p b z z >
p b z z <
p b z z =
b U
s U




W = ￿ [u(q) ￿  (q)] + U(c￿) ￿ c￿ (9)
s.t. ￿  (q) + d ￿ 0 (10)
￿id + ￿ [u(q) ￿ d] ￿ 0: (11)
The solution to (9)-(11) is in the pairwise core; otherwise, qp > q￿ and one could reduce both q
and d so as to increase the seller￿ s surplus in (10), the buyer￿ s expected surplus net of the cost of
holding money in (11), and the whole match surplus in (9). The optimal mechanism proposes the
DM allocation that maximizes the period expected utility of a representative household subject to
the individual rationality constraints of the seller, (10), and the buyer, (11). It corresponds to the
highest q ￿ q￿ so that (10) and (11) hold. The solution is











2 fq(i)g ￿ f  [q(i)]g otherwise, (13)
where q(i) is the positive solution to  (q) = ￿
i+￿u(q). So while the output level is uniquely deter-
9) , ( )] , ( [
p p z z d z z q u -
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p p z z d z z q u iz - + - s
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Figure 2: An incentive-feasible mechanism
mined, the transfer of real balances is not always unique. If the ￿rst-best level of output is feasible,
qp = q￿, then there is a range of real balances that are incentive feasible. This is simply saying
that provided that an agent￿ s participation constraint in the CM is not binding, there are many
ways one can split the surplus of a bilateral match, u(q￿) ￿  (q￿). In contrast, when the agent￿ s
participation constraint in the CM binds, then output and real balances are uniquely determined.
The solution to (9)-(11) is represented in Figure 3. If  (q￿) ￿ ￿
i+￿u(q￿) then q = q￿ and there
is an interval of real balances, between the curves  (q) and ￿
i+￿u(q), that are consistent with the
￿rst-best allocation. If  (q￿) > ￿
i0+￿u(q￿), then the ￿rst-best allocation is not implementable and
the quantity traded is q(i0) < q￿ at the intersection of  (q) and ￿
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Figure 3: Constrained-e¢ cient allocations












= f  [q(i)]g otherwise.
It speci￿es the set of real balances that are consistent with an optimal mechanism for a given
in￿ ation rate. The next proposition characterizes how money demand, output, and welfare vary
with in￿ ation.
Proposition 1 There is
￿ { =




1. For all i 2 [0;￿ {), qp(i) = q￿, @W
@i = 0, and Dp(i) ￿ Dp(i0) for all i0 < i;
2. For all i > ￿ {,
@qp
@i < 0, @dp
@i < 0, and @W
@i < 0.
The quantity ￿ { is the highest nominal interest rate below which the ￿rst-best level of output is
incentive-feasible. The right side of (14) can be interpreted as the expected nonpecuniary rate of
11return of money. It is the probability that an agent is a buyer in the DM times the ￿rst-best surplus
of a match expressed as a fraction of the cost to produce the ￿rst-best level of output. So the larger
the nonpecuniary rate of return of money, the larger the range of in￿ ation rates consistent with
the ￿rst-best allocation. The ￿rst part of Proposition 1 also shows that money is super-neutral for
low in￿ ation rates, and money demand is decreasing in the sense that the set of implementable real
balances at higher in￿ ation rates is contained in the set of implementable real balances at lower
in￿ ation rates. See Figure 4 for an illustration of the money demand correspondence. When the
buyer￿ s participation constraint binds, i > ￿ {, the nonpecuniary rate of return of currency evaluated
at the ￿rst-best level of output is less than the cost of holding currency: so the ￿rst best is not
implementable. In this case, money demand is a singleton, and the output produced and consumed
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Figure 4: Money demand correspondence
4 The observability of money holdings
Throughout the paper I assume that money holdings are not observable, i.e., agents can both hide
and overstate their money balances. In contrast, Hu, Kennan, and Wallace (2009) assume that
12while agents can hide their money balances, they cannot overstate them. Before turning to the
calibration of the model, it is useful to discuss the importance played by the nonobservability of
money balances. To do this, I derive the set of stationary, symmetric, incentive-feasible allocations
in the case where money holdings cannot be overstated.9
One crucial element to determine the set of implementable allocations is a necessary condition
under which the deviation that consists of not accumulating money in the CM is not pro￿table.
In the case where money holdings cannot be overstated, such a necessary condition takes the form
W(0) ￿ ￿W(0), i.e.,
￿izp + ￿ [u(qp) ￿  (qp)] ￿ 0: (15)
In contrast to (5), an agent who deviates in the CM and accumulates no money can no longer
secure the surplus ￿ (qp)+dp in the subsequent DM by overstating his money balances.10 Indeed,
the mechanism can potentially punish a seller who holds no money by assigning no surplus to this
seller. A deviation that is always feasible, however, consists of not accumulating money in the CM
and not trading in the subsequent DM. The expected surplus net of the cost of holding money from
this deviation is zero. It should be emphasized from (15) that the money holdings of an agent, zp,
need not coincide with the transfer in the DM, dp.
Lemma 2 Any allocation (qp;dp;zp) such that (qp;dp) 2 C(dp;dp) that satis￿es dp ￿ zp, (15) and
(6) can be implemented by the following coalition-proof trading mechanism:
(q;d) = arg max
q;d￿zb [d ￿  (q)] s.t. u(q) ￿ d ￿ u(qp) ￿ dp if min(zb;zs) ￿ zp (16)
= arg max
q;d￿zb [d ￿  (q)] s.t. u(q) ￿ d = 0 if zb < zp (17)
= arg max
q;d￿zb [u(q) ￿ d] s.t. ￿  (q) + d = 0 if zs < zp and zb ￿ zp: (18)
According to (16), if both the seller and the buyer in a bilateral match hold (and announce) more
than zp units of real balances, then the trade is the allocation in the pairwise core that generates
the same surplus for the buyer as the one he would have obtained under (qp;dp). According to (17),
if the buyer holds less than zp, then the mechanism proposes the preferred trade of the seller in the
9For instance, agents could choose to bring only a fraction of their money holdings to a bilateral match in the
DM.
10For readers familiar with the literature, the analysis of the set of implementable allocations in Hu, Kennan, and
Wallace (2009) is erroneous, as they impose (5) as a necessary condition for an implementable allocation instead of















Figure 5: Implementable allocations under observable (dark and light grey) and nonobservable
(light grey) money holdings.
pairwise core. Symmetrically, according to (18), if the seller holds less than zp and the buyer holds
at least zp, then the mechanism proposes the preferred trade of the buyer in the pairwise core.
The proof of Lemma 2 goes as follows. By construction, the buyer and the seller have incentives
to report truthfully their money holdings since their surpluses are nondecreasing with their money
holdings. If an agent believes that all his potential partners adhere to the equilibrium play and
hold zp units of real balances, then he has no incentives to deviate and hold less than zp since
otherwise, from (17) and (18), he would receive no surplus in the DM irrespective of whether he
turns into a buyer or a seller. He has no incentive to hold more than zp either since from (16) his
expected surplus in the DM is u(qp) ￿  (qp), which is independent of his real balances (provided
they are larger than zp).
The set of stationary, symmetric, incentive-feasible allocations when agents cannot overstate
their money holdings is
Ao(i) ￿
￿
(q;d;z) : (q;d) 2 C(z;z),  (q) ￿ d ￿ z ￿
￿ [u(q) ￿  (q)]
i
, d ￿ u(q)
￿
:
14Under unobservable money holdings,
Au(i) ￿
￿






The sets Ao and Au are represented in Figure 5. Under unobservable money holdings, all the pairs
(q;d) in the light grey area are implementable. If money holdings holding cannot be overstated, the
pairs (q;d) in the light and dark grey areas can be implemented. Therefore, under the assumption
of unobservable money holdings, the set of implementable real balances is smaller, i.e., for all i ￿ 0,
Au(i) ￿ Ao(i). Intuitively, when money holdings are observable, there is more leverage to punish
an agent who does not carry enough real balances. For my purpose, this implies that if the model
can ￿t money demand when money holdings are unobservable, this would also be the case when
money holdings are observable.
5 The irreducible cost of in￿ ation
In the previous section I derived an individual money demand correspondence, Dp(i). Following the
methodology of Lucas (2000) and LW, the next step is to construct the aggregate money demand
and to check whether there are parameter values for which it ￿ts the data. The model can then be
used to measure the cost of in￿ ation.
The aggregate demand for money is de￿ned as L ￿ M=PY , where M is the money supply, Y
is real aggregate output, and P is the price level. In the data, Y is measured by GDP, P by the
GDP de￿ ator, M by M1, and i by the short-term commercial paper rate. Real aggregate output is
composed of the CM output, A such that U0(A) = 1, and the DM output expressed in terms of the
numØraire good, ￿M=p. Hence, Y = A+￿M=p. Aggregate real balances are M=p = dp. Therefore,











A + ￿ (q￿)
;
￿u(q￿)
(i + ￿)A + ￿2u(q￿)
￿
if i ￿ ￿ { ￿





A + ￿  [q(i)]
if i > ￿ { ￿
￿ [u(q￿) ￿  (q￿)]
 (q￿)
: (20)
I adopt the same functional forms as in LW: U(c) = Alnc,  (e) = e, u(q) =
(q+b)1￿a￿b1￿a
1￿a . I
set ￿￿1 = 1:03, as in Lucas (2000). This gives four parameters, (A;a;b;￿), to adjust to attempt to
15￿t the money demand in the model to the data. Following the literature, b is chosen to be close to
0 so that the utility function approximates a CRRA.
First, I represent the money demand correspondence under an optimal mechanism for the
parameter values obtained in LW with symmetric Nash bargaining as the trading protocol. As
noticed in Hu, Kennan, and Wallace (2009, p.136), for this parametrization the ￿rst-best allocation
is implementable for all the interest rates observed in the data. However, as revealed by Figure
6, the money demand from the model is a poor ￿t for the data: all the observations except three
lie outside of the money demand correspondence. Intuitively, the optimal mechanism gives agents
incentives to accumulate enough real balances to trade the ￿rst-best level of output, whereas under
Nash bargaining the ￿rst-best level of output is never achieved, even when the cost of holding
money is zero. As a consequence, if the model is calibrated to ￿t the data under Nash bargaining,
the money demand under the optimal mechanism will tend to overestimate the money demand in
the data.
Figure 6: The LW speci￿cation: (A;a;￿) = (1:91;0:3;0:5).
The next step is to recalibrate the model. Figures 7 and 8 show that the model is able to
generate a money demand that is consistent with the observations in the data. In fact, all the
observations over the period 1900-2006 are in the money demand correspondence generated by the
model.11 In Figure 7, I adopt a utility function in the DM similar to the one in the CM with a unit
CRRA (a = 1:001), and I set the frequency of trade to its maximum value (￿ = 0:5). I chose the
11A noteworthy implication of the fact that the model is consistent with all the observations in the data is that
the downward shift in aggregate real balances observed at the end of the 70￿ s does not need to be explained by a
16value of CM output, A, to adjust the level of money demand. In Figure 8 I set b = 0 but choose
(￿;A;a) to generate a shape for the money demand correspondence that is visually close to the
data. Again, both parametrizations do equally well to account for the data.
Figure 7: ￿ = 0:5, A = 8, a = 1:001, b = 0:001.
Figure 8: ￿ = 0:1, A = 8, a = 0:78, b = 0
To understand how the model can match the empirical money demand, consider the following
two moments: L = min(Lt) is the minimum real balance and ￿ L = min(Lt) is the maximum real
balance observed in the data. One can choose parameters to match these two moments. To do this,















change in the fundamental structure of the economy. It could re￿ ect the fact that under an optimal mechanism real
balances need not be uniquely determined.
17To match these two targets one needs 1
A




u(q￿)+￿ = ￿ L, where imax is the
highest interest rate in the data. For a given ￿, one can choose A
 (q￿) su¢ ciently high to obtain
the lower bound for real balances. This is a condition on the relative size of the CM and DM
production levels. For a given ￿ and A




u(q￿) su¢ ciently low, or
 (q￿)
u(q￿)
su¢ ciently high, in order to achieve the upper bound for real balances. This can be interpreted as
a condition on the size of the gains from trade in the DM.
The welfare cost of a ￿ ￿ 1 percent in￿ ation is de￿ned as the fraction of total consumption
that agents would be willing to give up to reduce ￿ to 1. For the two parameterizations above,
the ￿rst-best level of output is achieved for all in￿ ation rates observed in the data. Therefore, the
welfare cost of 10 percent in￿ ation is 0. In LW, under Nash bargaining, the cost of in￿ ation is
3.2 percent of GDP every year. In the case where buyers play an ultimatum game, the cost of
in￿ ation is lowered to 1.2 percent of GDP, in the same ballpark as the estimate of Lucas (2000).
Using the same calibration methodology but applying a mechanism design approach, I just showed
that the part of the welfare cost of in￿ ation that can be attributed to monetary frictions alone, the
irreducible cost of in￿ ation, is zero.
The cost of in￿ ation that is measured in LW and the follow-up literature (see the survey in
Craig and Rocheteau, 2008) is essentially a welfare loss that can be attributed to suboptimal
trading mechanisms. Monetary frictions create a large welfare loss to the extent that they make
mechanisms that are optimal in pure credit economies￿ economies where bilateral credit can be
enforced￿ suboptimal when credit is no longer available. This is not to say that these trading
mechanisms are not empirically plausible￿ the data does not seem able to discriminate between
di⁄erent mechanisms. But the trading mechanisms that have been imposed in the literature are
not part of the frictions that make money essential, and when measuring the cost of in￿ ation, one
should disentangle the cost associated with those pure monetary frictions from the costs that stem
from socially ine¢ cient trading protocols.
6 Match-speci￿c heterogeneity
So far I have assumed that all buyers have the same preferences and all sellers have the same
technology. If there is heterogeneity across matches, and if agents have some private information
regarding their preferences or technologies, it is unclear whether the ￿rst-best allocation, which
18involves di⁄erent production levels in di⁄erent matches, is incentive feasible for some in￿ ation
rates. For instance, in an environment in which sellers o⁄er price schedules to buyers in bilateral
matches, Ennis (2008) ￿nds that the equilibrium is ine¢ cient (even at the Friedman rule) and the
cost of in￿ ation is large.
In this section I extend the model by assuming that once a buyer and a seller are matched,
a preference shock is realized that determines how much the buyer values the output produced
by the seller. Preferences are represented by the utility function "u(q) ￿ (e) + U(c) ￿ h, where
" 2 E ￿ [0;￿ "] is a match-speci￿c component drawn from a distribution G(").12 The preference
shock, ", is private information to the buyer.
An allocation rule in the DM maps a triple, (";zb;zs), the announced match-speci￿c compo-
nent and the announced buyer￿ s and seller￿ s real balances, into a match allocation, (q";d"), which
speci￿es the output in a match and the transfer of real balances. The mechanism must be incentive
compatible: the buyer is willing to reveal truthfully his preference shock and real balances, while
the seller is willing to reveal truthfully his real balances. The mechanism must also be individually
rational, i.e., buyers and sellers are willing to go along with the proposed allocation. Because there
is no clear notion of coalition-proof equilibrium in the presence of ex-post heterogeneity and private
information, I adopt the weaker notion of individually rational (IR) implementability that requires
the trades in pairwise meetings to be immune to individual defection.




") : " 2 E;zpg.
Buyers will be required to hold zp = max"(d
p
") real balances (since with unobservable money
holdings an agent will have no incentive to hold more money than what he spends in any match).







"0 for all "0 6= ". (21)
According to (21), the buyer will achieve a higher surplus by reporting his true preference shock,


























". Buyers with a high marginal utility of consumption receive
(weakly) more output and spend (weakly) more real balances than buyers with a low marginal
12This formalization is borrowed from Lagos and Rocheteau (2005).
19utility of consumption. This implies that an agent￿ s real balances must be z = d
p
￿ ". Individual




") for all " 2 [0;￿ "]. (22)
Both the buyer and the seller enjoy a positive surplus. Finally, necessary conditions for an agent





















for all z0 2 fd
p
" : " 2 E [ f0gg. The deviation that consists of reducing one￿ s real balances from z
to z0 < z and choosing the best o⁄er such that d
p
"0 < z0 must not be pro￿table. Note that when
evaluating this deviation I took into account only the buyer￿ s expected surplus in the DM, net
of the cost of holding real balances. Indeed, from the previous section, any incentive-compatible
mechanism is such that the seller￿ s expected surplus in the DM is independent of his real balances.




") : " 2 E;zpg that satis￿es zp = d
p
￿ ", (21), (22), and (23) is






") if zb ￿ d
p
￿ "; (24)
= (0;0) otherwise. (25)
The proof of Lemma 3 consists of showing that accumulating z = d
p
￿ " real balances is an optimal
strategy. From (24), by choosing z > d
p
￿ " an agent does not increase his surplus in the DM but he
incurs a higher cost of holding real balances, iz > id
p
￿ ". If the agent chooses z < d
p
￿ ", he can lie and
announce d
p
￿ ", but he will be restricted to o⁄ers such that d"0 ￿ z < d
p
￿ ", which from (23) lowers his
expected utility. Alternatively, the buyer can choose to reveal truthfully his real balances but then,
from (25), the mechanism proposes no trade in the DM.
6.1 Discrete preference shocks
Following Curtis and Wright (2004) and Ennis (2008), I consider a speci￿cation in which the
preference shock can take two values, " 2 f"‘;"hg with "h > "‘. The probability of the high
preference shock is ￿h, while the probability of the low preference shock is ￿‘ = 1 ￿ ￿h. In this































The condition (26) speci￿es that an agent prefers to accumulate zp real balances instead of 0, i.e.,
the expected surplus of a buyer net of the cost of holding real balances is non-negative. According
to (27), an agent does not decrease his surplus by holding zp real balances instead of d
p
"‘. If an
agent chooses to hold d
p
"‘ real balances, he incurs a lower cost of holding real balances, but in the
event that he has a high marginal utility of consumption, he has to report a low marginal utility




















In the following I establish the conditions under which the ￿rst-best allocation is implementable.
The ￿rst best requires q"h = q￿
h and q"‘ = q￿
‘, where "hu0(q￿
h) =  0(q￿
h) and "‘u0(q￿
‘) =  0(q￿
‘).
Proposition 2 Consider an economy with preference shocks in f"‘;"hg that are private informa-
tion to buyers. There exists ￿ { 2 (0;1) such that the ￿rst-best allocation is implementable for all
i 2 [0;￿ {].
There is a range of in￿ ation rates, including the Friedman rule, that implement the ￿rst-best
allocation. So, as in the case with homogenous matches, the ￿rst-best allocation can be obtained
even with in￿ ation rates above the Friedman rule.
To conclude this section, I provide a calibrated example with match-speci￿c heterogeneity where
the money demand correspondence ￿ts the data. Real output in the DM expressed in terms of the
numØraire good is ￿(￿hz+￿‘d"‘) since in h-type matches the buyer spends all his real balances and
in ‘-type matches the buyer spends d"‘ < z. Hence, aggregate output is Y = A + ￿(￿hz + ￿‘d‘).




A + ￿￿hz + ￿￿‘d"‘
: (z;d"‘) 2 A￿(i)
￿
,
21where A￿(i) is the set of pairs (z;d‘) 2 R2+ such that (21), (22), and (23) hold with q"h = q￿
h and
q"‘ = q￿
‘. I normalize "h = 1. To make the match-speci￿c heterogeneity relevant I take "‘ = 0:5
and ￿h = 0:5. The frequency of meetings is assumed to be maximum, ￿ = 0:5, and I set a = 0:9.
I choose the parameter A so that all points in the data are in the money demand correspondence.
See Figure 9. For this example, the welfare cost of (moderate) in￿ ation is 0.
Figure 9: "‘ = 0:5, "h = 1, ￿h = 0:5, ￿ = 0:5, a = 0:9, A = 8
6.2 Continuous preference shocks







































If the ￿rst-best level of output is implemented, "u0(q
p
") =  0(q
p
"), which implies @d
p
"







0 = 0. Hence,
dp
" =   (q￿
"):
In order to implement the ￿rst-best, the transfer of real balances must be equal to the disutility
cost of the seller. So the participation constraints (22) are satis￿ed.
I now turn to the buyer￿ s incentives to accumulate real balances in the CM. Consider a buyer
with d
p
~ " real balances in a match of type ". This buyer can buy at most q￿
~ " units of output. He will
22announce a preference type, ^ ", that maximizes ["u(q￿
^ ") ￿  (q￿
^ ")]Ifq￿
^ "￿q￿
~ "g. The solution is ^ " = " if
~ " ￿ " and otherwise ^ " = ~ ". Provided that the buyer has enough real balances to purchase the ￿rst-
best level of output given his preference type, he will announce his type truthfully. If he doesn￿ t
hold enough real balances, he will announce the highest type consistent with his real balances, ~ ".
Therefore, the buyer￿ s choice of real balances in the CM is equivalent to the choice of a threshold,
~ ", below which the buyer consumes the ￿rst-best level of output and above which the buyer is
constrained by his real balances. It solves






























Interestingly, this ￿rst-order condition is the same as the one obtained in Lagos and Rocheteau
(2005) under buyers-take-all bargaining. Unless i = 0, the ￿rst-best is not implementable.13 This
also tells us that the cost of in￿ ation will be bounded above by the cost obtained under buyers-
take-all bargaining, which is about 1.2 percent of GDP.
So far I assumed that money holdings were not observable and could be overstated. If money
holdings cannot be overstated, then agents will be willing to accumulate the socially e¢ cient quan-
tity of real balances, d
p









There is an interval of in￿ ation rates above the Friedman rule that are consistent with the imple-
mentation of the ￿rst-best.
7 Endogenous participation
As shown in Section 5 under an optimal mechanism, aggregate money demand is a correspondence:
for low in￿ ation rates the division of the surplus in a bilateral match is not uniquely pinned down.
A natural way to endogenize the division of the match surplus ￿thereby re￿ning money demand ￿
is to let agents choose which side of the DM market they participate in. Indeed, the division of the
gains from trade in the DM a⁄ects the composition of the market in terms of buyers and sellers,
13This result is consistent with Faig and Jerez (2006), who assume that sellers compete to attract buyers.
23the measure of trades, and therefore society￿ s welfare. In order to endogenize participation, I follow
the approach of Shi (1997) in the context of a large household model and Rocheteau and Wright
(2009) in the LW model.
I assume that there is a unit measure of ex ante identical agents who choose to be either buyers
or sellers in the DM. The decision to become a buyer or seller in period t is taken at the beginning of
the previous CM, in period t￿1. Suppose, for example, that at the beginning of the CM, individuals
invest in a (costless) technology that allows them to either produce DM goods or consume them,
and it is only possible to invest in one technology.14
Let n denote the measure of buyers in the DM, ￿ = 1￿n
n the ratio of sellers per buyer (market
tightness), and ￿(￿) the matching probability of a buyer. The matching function has standard
properties: ￿(0) = 0, ￿0 > 0, ￿0(0) ￿ 1, ￿0(1) = 0, ￿00 < 0. The matching probability of a seller is






[u(q) ￿  (q)] + U(c) ￿ c: (30)







The ￿rst-best allocation is such that q = q￿, n = n￿, and c = c￿.







denotes the buyer￿ s real balances and z
p
s the seller￿ s real balances. Let Wb (Ws) denote the value
function of an agent in the CM who chooses to be a buyer (seller) in the next DM, and V b (V s)
denotes the value function of a buyer (seller) in the DM. The value function at the beginning of
the CM is similar to (2) and satis￿es
Wj(z) = T + z + max
c￿0
fU(c) ￿ cg + max
^ z￿0
￿
￿￿^ z + ￿V j(^ z)
￿
; (32)
where j 2 fb;sg. The value of being a buyer in the DM satis￿es







14One can think of the DM good as being an intermediate good, where sellers produce the intermediate good and
buyers produce a ￿nal good that requires the intermediate good as an input. The ￿nal good is produced after the
buyer and seller split apart. Therefore, the ￿nal good cannot be consumed by both the buyer and seller.
24Substituting (33) into (32), and using the linearity of Wb (z) and Ws (z), the value of a buyer with
z units of real balances at the beginning of the CM satis￿es
Wb(z) = T + z + max
c￿0







￿ f￿iz + ￿(￿)fu[q(z;zp
s)] ￿ d(z;zp
s)gg:
By similar reasoning, the value of being a seller with z units of real balances satis￿es
Ws(z) = T + z + max
c



























For the trading mechanism to be incentive-compatible, the seller￿ s surplus must be independent of
his real balances. Consequently, from (35), sellers do not carry real balances in the DM, z
p
s = 0.
A buyer will never ￿nd it optimal to carry more money than he spends (otherwise he would
have an incentive to misreport his money balances), so an incentive-compatible mechanism must
be such that dp = z
p




b + ￿(￿)[u(qp) ￿ dp] =
￿(￿)
￿
[dp ￿   (qp)] ￿ 0; (36)
where ￿ = 1￿np
np . The left side of (36) is the expected surplus of a buyer, net of the cost of holding
real balances. The right side of (36) is the expected surplus of a seller.




s), that satis￿es z
p
s = 0, (6) and (36) and (qp;dp) 2
C(z
p
b;0) can be implemented by the trading mechanism (7)-(8).
The trading mechanism (7)-(8) guarantees that a buyer accumulates z
p
b real balances in the CM,
reveals truthfully his money holdings, and agrees to the trade (qp;dp). Given the proposed terms
of trade, agents are indi⁄erent between being buyers or sellers, i.e., condition (36) holds, when the
measure of buyers is equal to np.









[u(q) ￿  (q)] + U(c￿) ￿ c￿ (37)














[d ￿   (q)]: (39)







 (q￿) such that















+ i(1 ￿ n￿)
: (40)
Moreover, @W
@i = 0 and
@(Mt=pt)
@i < 0;
2. For all i > ￿ {, qp < q￿, np < n￿. Moreover, @W
@i < 0 and
@(Mt=pt)
@i < 0.
In contrast to Shi (1997) and Rocheteau and Wright (2009), where terms of trade are determined
by bargaining, under an optimal mechanism the ￿rst-best allocation can be implemented for low
in￿ ation rates. If the cost of holding money is lower than the threshold ￿ {, then the ￿rst-best
allocation is incentive feasible. According to (40), the transfer of real balances is a decreasing
function of the nominal interest rate. As the nominal interest rate increases, it is more costly to
hold money and in order to keep the buyers￿and sellers￿incentives to participate in the market
unchanged, buyers must be compensated by a larger share of the match surplus (which implies that
they hold fewer real balances). If the cost of holding money is larger than the threshold ￿ {, then the
￿rst-best allocation is no longer incentive feasible. The allocation is chosen so that agents are just
indi⁄erent between participating and not participating in the market. In this case, output and the
measure of buyers in the DM decrease with in￿ ation.




dp and M=P = npdp.








I adopt the same functional forms as before,  (e) = e, u(q) =
(q+b)1￿a￿b1￿a
1￿a , but here I set b = 0
and restrict a in (0;1). I adopt the matching function that is commonly used in the literature,
￿(￿) = ￿￿
1+￿. The matching probability of a buyer, ￿(1 ￿ n), is proportional to the measure of
sellers. Symmetrically, the matching probability of a seller, ￿n, is proportional to the measure of
buyers. The measure of DM trades is maximum when n = 1=2.
In Figure 10 below I set a = 0:95 and I look for the pair (￿;A) that provides the best ￿t with
the data by minimizing squared residuals. I consider the whole sample, 1900-2006, as well as the
subsample 1981-2006. For the whole sample a good ￿t requires a low frequency of trade, ￿ = 0:06.
26This suggests that shocks where the liquidity constraints bind in the DM have to be infrequent for
the model to match the data. For the subsample 1981-2006 money demand is ￿ atter and a good
￿t is obtained for a much larger frequency of trades, ￿ = 0:47. For both examples, a 10 percent
in￿ ation imposes no cost on society.
Figure 10: 1900-2006: ￿ = 0:06, A = 12:55, a = 0:95; 1981-2006: ￿ = 0:47, A = 29:43, a = 0:95.
8 Conclusion
I have studied the welfare cost of in￿ ation in an environment in which money plays an essential role.
When the trading mechanism in pairwise meetings is chosen optimally, aggregate money demand
takes the form of a correspondence that can ￿t the data over the period 1900-2006. The welfare
cost of moderate in￿ ation that can be attributed to monetary frictions alone is zero. Hence, in
contrast to some common wisdom, in￿ ation does not need to impose a large burden on society
when the only frictions in the environment are the ones that make money useful. This insight
is robust to di⁄erent assumptions regarding the observability of money holdings, the introduction
of match-speci￿c heterogeneity, and endogenous participation decisions. It is important to recall
that this prediction relies on the trading mechanism being socially e¢ cient. If agents were to
trade according to some other mechanism ￿some mechanisms despite being socially ine¢ cient have
strong strategic foundations ￿the cost of in￿ ation would be large, as argued in the literature. This
reinforces Williamson and Wright￿ s (2010) assessment that ￿getting into the details of monetary
27theory can make a big di⁄erence for quantitative and policy analysis.￿
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31APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1.
Part 1. From (12), the threshold ￿ { for i below which the ￿rst-best level of output is imple-
mentable, qp(i) = q￿, is the largest value of i such that  (q￿) ￿ ￿
i+￿u(q￿). Hence,  (q￿) = ￿
￿ {+￿u(q￿),
which gives (14). From (9) W = ￿ [u(q￿) ￿  (q￿)]+U(c￿)￿c￿ is independent of i. Hence, @W
@i = 0










for all i0 < i.
Part 2. From (13), for all i > ￿ {, q(i) is the positive solution to  (q) = ￿
i+￿u(q). Hence,
u0(qp) < i+￿
￿  0(qp) (since ￿





￿u0(qp) ￿ (i + ￿) 0(qp)
< 0:
Since dp =  (qp) with  0 > 0, @dp









where I used that qp < q￿ and hence u0(qp) ￿  0(qp) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Denote A￿(i) the set of pairs (z;d‘) 2 R2+ such that (21), (22),
and (23) hold with q"h = q￿
h and q"‘ = q￿
‘. If i = 0, the constraints (21) and (22), which imply (23),
can be reexpressed as:
"‘ [u(qh) ￿ u(q‘)] ￿ dh ￿ d‘ ￿ "h [u(qh) ￿ u(q‘)]
 (q") ￿ d" ￿ "u(q") for all " 2 f"‘;"hg.
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where ^ d = minf (q￿
h) ￿ "‘ [u(q￿
h) ￿ u(q￿
‘)];"‘u(q￿
‘)g >  (q￿




h) > 0 for all x >  (q￿
‘). So ￿[A￿(0)] > 0.



























￿ z(i;x) ￿ "‘ [u(q￿
h) ￿ u(q￿
‘)]dx:


















Consequently, there is an i < 1 such that A￿(i) is empty and ￿[A￿(i)] = 0. By the continuity of
￿[A￿(i)], there is a threshold, ￿ { > 0, such that for all i < ￿ {, ￿[A￿(i)] > 0 and A￿(i) 6= ?.

















+ i(1 ￿ n￿)
; (42)







 (q￿) , where ￿ { is obtained from (38) at equality with qp and dp as de￿ned







[u(q) ￿  (q)] (43)





[u(q) ￿   (q)] = 0: (44)
















i + U(c￿) ￿ c￿:






























i . From the Envelope Theorem,
@W
@i































Suppose qp > q￿. One can reduce qp to q￿ and increase u(qp) ￿  (qp), and dp can be chosen such
that the buyers￿and sellers￿incentives to participate are una⁄ected. To see this denote d0 and d1













[d0 ￿   (q￿)] = 0: (48)
From q￿ < qp,   (q￿) <   (qp), u(q￿) ￿   (q￿) > u(qp) ￿   (qp), and










[u(qp) ￿   (qp)] = 0:













d0 ￿   (q￿) = 0 < d1 ￿   (q￿):
34By continuity, there is a d 2 [d0;d1] such that (39) holds with q = q￿ and n = np. From (37), such a
deviation raises W. Moreover, from (46), qp 6= q￿ since otherwise np = n￿ and i ￿ ￿ {. Consequently,
qp < q￿ and @W
@i < 0. To show that np < n￿, notice ￿rst from (46) that np 6= n￿. From (45) n is a
decreasing function of q. So if np > n￿, one can reduce n and increase q, which would raise welfare.
From (38) at equality and (44), W(i) = inpdp + U(c￿) ￿ c￿, with npdp = Mt
pt . The result @W
@i < 0
implies
@(Mt=pt)
@i < 0.
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